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Recent Developments
Attorneys' Settlement Covenants Not to Accept Future
Cases: Antitrust and Ethical Considerations
In an increasing number of [private antitrust] cases defendants have been
insisting as a condition of settlement that the plaintiff's lawyer agree that
neither he nor his associates will be involved in another case against the de-
fendant for a five or ten-year period of time involving the same product ....
In some cases, the request has been that plaintiff's lawyer agree not to bring
any kind of case against the defendant . . .for a specified period .... I (Em-
phasis added.)
As an added condition to settlement, extraneous to the main litigation and binding on
the attorney alone, it is his individual prerogative to agree to the condition and there-
by limit his future practice. When his client is obtaining what he considers to be an
advantageous settlement, refusal to accept the condition becomes especially unattrac-
tive. In such circumstances the attorney, with the welfare of his client in mind, is likely
to agree to the condition.
What are the effects on the attorney who so agrees? Is such an agreement binding?
Is he acting ethically when he agrees to so limit his future practice? Is the defendant's
attorney who either suggests or includes the condition in the settlement acting prop-
erly?
Is the Attorney Bound?
The agreement by the plaintiff's attorney with the defendant is identical to the com-
mon law covenant not to compete. Absent any statutory considerations, is the attorney
bound?
At common law covenants not to compete were categorized as: 1) ancillary, i.e., a
covenant subordinate to the main lawful purpose of a larger transaction (e.g., employ-
ment or the sale of a business); and 2) nonancillary, i.e., a "naked covenant not to
compete." 2 The validity of the former was judged as to its reasonableness, 3 while there
was a diversity of opinion on the treatment of the latter.4 These defendant-plaintiff's
attorney settlement covenants, not founded on any basic transaction between the at-
1. Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 94
(1966).
2. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 4 (1968).
3. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1379-96 (1962) ; 5 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON,
CONTRACTS §§ 1636-53 (1937); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 514-15 (1932).
4. According to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1911), at
common law all covenants not to compete, including those nonancillary, were judged by
their reasonableness. But United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), says that reason-
ableness applied only to ancillary covenants; nonancillary, having nothing to justify or
excuse them, were void.
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torney and the defendant, are clearly nonancillary. Even if nonancillary covenants are
to be judged by their reasonableness, these particular covenants are unreasonable and
would be illegal at common law. Inquiry into reasonableness includes a consideration
of the interests of the person seeking protection, of the person being restrained, and of
the public. If the covenant reasonably protects the valid interests of these parties, it is
allowed to stand.
Courts were established to allow redress to persons injured by others. Covenants not
to accept future cases tend to insulate the defendant from liability to those he has
wronged, thus protecting an invalid interest. The interest of the public is especially in-
jured by the removal of counsel when his practice is highly specialized and there are
few other practitioners in his area of expertise: all later claimants must duplicate the
initial expenditures in preparing suit against the defendant. This results not only in a
misallocation of resources, but also can effectively deprive the small claimant of legiti-
mate redress. Since such a covenant does not protect any legitimate interest, unneces-
sarily restrains the attorney and cuts off the rightful redress of the small claimant, it
can be viewed as void because contrary to public policy; under this view, such a cove-
nant would not bind the agreeing plaintiff's attorney.
Antitrust Implications
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is ... illegal ... ."S
Contract, combination, or conspiracy. The initial agreement between a defendant
and a plaintiff's attorney establishes the restraining contract. But, as the same defend-
ant settles more suits and the settlement covenants proliferate, a more broad horizontal
conspiracy among covenanting attorneys may appear. Such a conspiracy must be based
on some agreement among the attorneys. To establish agreement it has been suggested
that the nexus between horizontal conspirators may be provided by the individual seek-
ing their agreement to the plan.6 "Acceptance by competitors, without previous agree-
ment, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if
carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful
conspiracy under the Sherman Act." 7 Such parallel, if not exactly duplicated, action
by a group of attorneys becoming in fact a practice in the settlement of litigation may
establish conspiracy.
Restraint. The Supreme Court, construing the Sherman Act in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader,8 reasoned: "[i]n seeking more effective protection of the public from the
growing evils of restraints on the competitive system . . . the legislators found ready at
their hand the common law concept of illegal restraints of trade or commerce. In en-
acting the Sherman law they took over that concept by condemning such [illegal]
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallel-
ism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 701 (1962).
7. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
8. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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restraints wherever they occur in or affect commerce between the states." 9 Although
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is literally all-encompassing, the courts have construed it
to preclude only those contracts, covenants or conspiracies which unreasonably restrain
trade or commerce.1 0 To be legal all covenants not to compete must be at least reason-
able, i.e., meet the "Rule of Reason." 11 Clearly the defendant who covenants with 20
attorneys who have represented clients against him imposes a significantly more un-
reasonable restraint on those seeking redress than 20 separate defendants who each
bind one attorney. The binding of one attorney may be a restraint if it acts to limit
access to his services; a finding of unreasonableness here, however, would require that a
significant number of qualified attorneys in the area of expertise be restricted.
Yet the courts have come to recognize that some restraints are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable per se by their nature or necessary effects. 12 "Where such restraints
are established, in purpose or in effect, inquiry under the Rule of Reason ends."' 3 The
Supreme Court has applied the per se rule to concerted refusals to deal.' 4 As the num-
ber of attorneys agreeing to such settlement covenants with a defendant increases, the
presence of a group refusal to deal with those persons excluded by the covenants ap-
pears. The unreasonableness of the covenant is magnified in any area of the law in
which there is a tendency to specialize, where the removal of even a small number of
attorneys is relatively significant. Presently these covenants abound in at least one such
specialized area, that of litigation of private antitrust actions.'5 Whether or not these
nonancillary restraints should be placed among those classified as per se unreasonable,
1 6
under these circumstances they should be found violative of the Rule of Reason.
Interstate trade or commerce. Illegality under the federal antitrust laws rests on
restraint of interstate trade or commerce. In determining which activities constitute
interstate trade or commerce, the initial inquiry must decide which activities constitute
trade or commerce.
The Sherman Act applies to sales of both services and goods.1 7 Whether attorneys,
in rendering professional services, are engaged in "trade" is an open question.' 8 In
9. Id. at 497-98. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54 (1911);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
10. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
11. The test is attributed to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. The per se rule has been applied to agreements fixing prices, limiting production,
dividing markets, establishing resale price maintenance, and setting up group boycotts
and concerted refusals to deal. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, supra note 2, at 18.
13. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 12 (1955).
14. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
15. Alioto, supra note 1; A.B.A. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS [hereinafter cited
as A.B.A. COMM.] INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1039 (1968).
16. See Comment, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Re-
flections on the Kor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1959).
17. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 489-92
(1950).
18. For a further discussion on the questionable nature of professional exemption
from the antitrust laws, see Coleman, The Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 48 (1967).
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American Medical Association v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court, upholding a
conviction of the Association for conspiring to coerce practicing physicians from ac-
cepting employment by Group Health (government employees' medical risk-sharing
plan), avoided deciding whether a physician's practice of medicine was "trade," focus-
ing on the commercial dealings of Group Health. More recently, however, the Court
affirmed a decision by the United States District Court for the District of Utah which
held: "[t]he fact that a pharmacist in filling a prescription is engaged in . . . a
learned profession does not immunize [him] from the application of ...the Sher-
man Act."'20 From this it might be conjectured that the Court would view an attorney
litigating a case under the same light.
It is not necessary, however, for the application of the antitrust laws to these cove-
nants that the attorney be engaged in "trade;" also being restrained are those engaged
in commerce who cannot obtain his services. As Group Health was restrained, so are
future claimants in need of the legal services for suit against the settling defendant.
It is unquestionable that the scope of the Sherman Act extends to the constitutional
limits of the commerce power.2 ' The interstate nature of trade or commerce restrained
may be evidenced by the character of the activities of those seeking redress-the deal-
ings of Group Health supplied the interstate factor necessary for the application of the
Sherman Act in the American Medical Association case. Interstate character may also
be established by widespread agreement to similar covenants by attorneys across the
nation.
Illegality. The proliferation of such covenants creates an unreasonable restraint
amounting to a concerted refusal to deal with a class of claimants needing professional
service. When interstate in nature the conspiracy evidenced by parallel activity among
attorneys comes within the boundaries of those contracts, combinations and con-
spiracies made illegal by the Sherman Act.
Ethical Considerations
The American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics has expressed signifi-
cant concern for the ethical questions involved in these covenants.2 2 The Canons of
Professional Ethics of the ABA have been adopted, with some variation, by every
state.23
The plaintiff's attorney. The attorney has the right to determine what cases he will
19. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
20. United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Utah),
af'd mem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
21. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, rehearing
denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944).
22. A.B.A. COMM., INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1039 (1968).
23. Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW. 323, 325
(1965). Presently observed mainly as a disciplinary code rather than as positive stand-
ards, the Canons are now being revised by the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards. The need for revision is based on the difficulty in fitting the gen-
eral principles first stated in 1908 into the context of present-day legal practice. Such
difficulty, however, does not render the present Canons useless; their general standards
are still applicable.
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accept, 24 but the attorney with present clients has a duty to refrain from any action
which may jeopardize their interests. The plaintiff's attorney owes a duty to his clients
not to restrain the availability of his services. The attorney without present duties to
the interests of other clients or potential clients still has a duty to his profession to re-
frain from illegal acts; this duty may extend to refraining from such covenants as the
one under discussion. Furthermore, in agreeing to an illegal covenant to aid his client
the attorney violates Canon 32: "No client ...is entitled to receive nor should any
lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law .... ,,25
If one engaged in business acts unethically by making an agreement knowing it will
not bind him or having no intention to abide by it, does the attorney act any less im-
properly in agreeing to a settlement condition knowing it to be void as against public
policy? And is not knowledge of the unenforceability of such a covenant reasonably to
be presumed to exist in the attorney, negating any claim of his lack of such knowledge?
The attorney who accepts additional consideration for the covenant opens himself to
charges of double-dealing. For successful settlement of the suit he is paid by both liti-
gants. If payment for the attorney's covenant becomes a practice, an unscrupulous
attorney, motivated by an expectation of added consideration from the opposing party,
might sacrifice his client's interest in advising settlement for less than the client should
rightfully recover, in order to keep himself in good stead with the settling defendant.
The defendant's attorney. In aiding defendant to require the plaintiff's attorney to
agree to this covenant, the defendant's attorney violates Canon 7, which condemns
"[e]fforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the professional employ-
ment of another lawyer .... -26 He is destroying the plaintiff's attorney's right to
choose freely which clients he will represent and may be, in fact, destroying his prac-
tice. In addition, by suggesting, or including in the settlement at his client's request,
the agreement of the plaintiff's attorney, the defendant's attorney may violate Canon
32 by rendering advice involving disloyalty to the law.
May the defendant's attorney request that the plaintiff's attorney give up his free-
dom when the reason for the request is the immunization of the defendant from suits
in the public interest? The Ethics Committee has expressed the opinion that the
answer to this question must be "no."' 27
Conclusion
Both the attorney who requests and the attorney who agrees to the covenant herein
discussed are acting beneath those standards which the legal profession has established
to govern the conduct of its members. In so agreeing the plaintiff's attorney may be
violating the antitrust laws and making himself liable to prosecution. The defendant
himself is equally violating the antitrust laws. The wise, ethical attorney would do
better for himself and his client to avoid the inclusion of such a condition in settlement
agreements.
24. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 31.
25. Id. No. 32.
26. Id. No. 7.
27. A.B.A. COMM., INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1039 (1968).
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